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Direct payments have been heralded by the disability movement as an important means to
achieving independent living and hence greater social justice for disabled people through
enhanced recognition as well as financial redistribution. Drawing on data from the ESRC
funded project Disabled People and Direct Payments: A UK Comparative Perspective,
this paper presents an analysis of policy and official statistics on use of direct payments
across the UK. It is argued that the potential of direct payments has only partly been
realised as a result of very low and uneven uptake within and between different parts
of the UK. This is accounted for in part by resistance from some Labour-controlled local
authorities, which regard direct payments as a threat to public sector jobs. In addition,
access to direct payments has been uneven across impairment groups. However, from a
very low base there has been a rapid expansion in the use of direct payments over the
past three years. The extent to which direct payments are able to facilitate the ultimate
goal of independent living for disabled people requires careful monitoring.
I n t roduct ion : soc ia l j us t i ce and d i rec t payments
As noted by Goodlad and Riddell in this special edition, social justice may be
conceptualised in relation to the distribution of both material and social goods, the
latter including access to education and social services (Harvey, 1992). Social justice is
also concerned with cultural claims, associated with the politics of recognition or identity
(Young, 1990). Sometimes, the politics of redistribution and the politics of recognition have
been construed as separate, and possibly competing, arenas of struggle. For example,
Fraser maintained that the focus on identity politics was detracting from the struggle
to achieve economic inequality for marginalised groups (Fraser, 1997). Phillips (1997)
has argued that the distribution of material and social goods and social respect are not
separate but inter-connected, so that individuals and groups who enjoy high social status
are likely to secure access to better welfare services, thus further boosting their economic
position and social prestige. Conversely, disadvantaged groups are likely to experience
inequalities in accessing services, further exacerbating their cultural and economic
marginalisation.
Direct payments is a form of welfare whereby cash payments are made directly to the
individual to purchase the services they are assessed as requiring. The development of
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direct payments has been a key goal of the disability movement for the past two decades
and has been seen as playing a role in the struggle for both redistribution and recognition.
In relation to redistribution, it is envisaged that by allowing disabled people the freedom
to determine the types of assistance they require, the quality of services available will be
improved. In relation to recognition, direct payments are regarded as having the potential
to improve the social status of disabled people by transforming their identity from that of
passive service recipient to active employer, creating wealth in the increasingly important
service sector Barnes (2004). This paper draws on data from the ESRC funded project
Disabled People and Direct Payments: A UK Comparative Perspective, which is being
carried out by researchers at the Universities of Edinburgh, Glasgow and Leeds between
2004 and 2006. The research includes an analysis of policy and official statistics on uptake
of direct payments, telephone interviews with local authority representatives throughout
the UK and case studies of local authorities with different approaches.
In the paper, we first briefly describe the development of direct payments, before
considering their contribution to social justice goals concerned with both redistribution
and recognition. We explore the extent to which direct payments are equally available
to disabled people in relation to geographical location, political complexion of the local
authority and impairment group. Subsequently, we consider the extent to which direct
payments appear to be having a positive impact in reducing the poverty experienced by
disabled people relative to the rest of the population. Finally, we consider the extent to
which direct payments may contribute to social justice goals by enhancing the respect
accorded to disabled people by repositioning them as active agents rather than passive
recipients of welfare.
The deve lopment o f d i rec t payments
Disabled people’s struggle to cast off the discourse of charity has been well documented
by writers such as Oliver (1990). A key part of the struggle centred round the achievement
of support services geared towards allowing people to live independently. In the 1960s
and 1970s, the Disablement Income Group campaigned for a ‘modest disability income’,
but this solution was rejected by the disability movement on the grounds that it did
not alter the fundamentally unequal relationship between the individual and the state
and the damaged identity this produced. The Union of the Physically Impaired Against
Segregation argued:
Disabled individuals wishing to claim the disability income would be required to present
themselves for assessment by ‘social administrators’. They would have to appear ‘passive,
nervous’ and ‘deferential’ in order to conform to the expert view of disability; in other words,
they would have to reinforce all the traditional assumptions associated with disabled people,
and thus relinquish any claims to economic and social equality. (UPIAS, 1976, 18, cited in
Barnes, 2004)
The idea of a ‘modest disability income’ was dismissed, therefore, partly because it
was likely to have only a limited impact on reducing poverty, but also because it was
unlikely to tackle the problem of lack of respect. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Centres for
Independent Living (CIL) in the US, notably the Berkeley CIL, had experienced some
success in persuading the local state to make payments to individuals to purchase
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the support services needed to underpin social inclusion. This philosophy, rooted in a
human rights approach, was adopted by emerging CILs in the UK (Barnes, 2004). In
1988, in response to active campaigning, the Independent Living Fund was established,
which involved the Department for Social Security (DSS) making direct cash payments to
individuals.
Despite the fact that the DSS had demonstrated the feasibility of making cash pay-
ments to individuals, local authorities were not permitted to make direct payments
and there were concerns about exploitation and fraud. Indirect payment schemes were
developed, whereby funds were channelled via a third party such as a voluntary orga-
nisation to a disabled person to purchase personal assistance. Following further
campaigning and the publication of research demonstrating the cost effectiveness of
direct payments (Zarb and Nadash, 1994), the Direct Payments Act 1996 eventually
provided the legislative basis to enable schemes to develop (see Department of Health,
2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2002, 2003). The scope of direct payment schemes has extended
over time (see Department of Health, 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2002, 2003), and they have
now become mandatory throughout the UK. The Scottish Executive recently announced
its intentions to extend direct payments to all community care users, including refugees
and asylum seekers, women fleeing domestic violence and people recovering from drug
and alcohol addiction. Having resisted direct payments for many years, the governments
of the UK and the devolved administrations now strongly promote direct payments as
articulating with both the social justice and modernising welfare agendas. As we shall
see below, this enthusiasm is not shared by all local authorities, some of whom argue that
direct payments undermine other services and threaten public sector jobs. The impact
of direct payments, and their implications for social justice, is discussed in the following
section.
Di rec t payments in prac t ice
Take -up ac ross the UK
As a first step in the ESRC project referred to above, we set out to identify patterns in the
uptake of direct payments in different parts of the UK and to explore the impact of a range
of variables, including the political control of the local authority, the number of people
reporting a long-term limiting illness in the 2001 census and the presence of a support
organisation for disabled people wishing to make use of direct payments. All direct
payments figures are based on publicly available statistics and statistical breakdowns
available on 18 February 2004. They include all direct and indirect payments recorded
by relevant authorities. The term ‘direct payments’ is thus being used generically to cover
all cash payments made to individuals to purchase services, whether these are made
through a third party or not. Information was obtained from the Scottish Executive, Direct
Payments Scotland, the Department of Health, the Local Government Data Unit Wales,
the Information Unit at the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety
Northern Ireland and the National Centre for Independent Living.
Table 1 shows that England has about twice the number of DP users relative to its
population compared with Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, despite having the
lowest proportion of people with long-term illness or disability. Nonetheless, there have
been significant increases in use throughout the UK.
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Table 1 Direct payment users in each country/province of the UK between 2000/1 and
2003: number and rate per thousand people with LTID
2000/1: number & 2002/3: number & 2003: number &
Country/ rate per thousand rate per thousand rate per thousand
province Population % LTID people with LTID people with LTID people with LTID
England 50 million 18 4,900 (0.54) 6,300 (0.7) 9,700 (1.0)
Scotland 5 million 20 207 (0.20) 392 (0.4) 571 (0.57)
Wales 3 million 23 ∗ 185 (0.26) ∗
Northern 1.5 million 23 33 (0.09) 49 (0.14) 128 (0.37)
Ireland
Notes:
 Figures for Wales not available for 2000/01 and 2003.
 LTID refers to the percentage of people reporting a long-term limiting illness or disability in the
2001 Census. 10.9 million people in the UK reported LTID with significant regional variations
(London & South East: 15 per cent; Northeast England: 23 per cent).
Take -up by loca l au tho r i t y
The large majority of authorities in the UK (89 per cent) reported direct payment users in
their locality. The mean number of direct payment users per authority was 44. However,
there is considerable variation both by authority and by devolved area. The highest
number of direct payment users in England (642) are recorded as being in Essex; the
highest number in Scotland (120) are in Fife; in Wales, Cardiff (47); and in Northern
Ireland, Armargh and Dungannon (47). Initially we identified those authorities that have
0–1 Direct Payment users and, secondly, the ten UK authorities with the highest numbers
of Direct Payment users.
Based on currently available data for the UK there are 18 authorities without any
direct payment users. Of the 18 authorities with no reported direct payments users, ten
are in Scotland, five in Wales and two in Northern Ireland. For England only the Isles of
Scilly does not have any reported Direct Payment users. Tables 2 and 3 show relevant
authority areas in detail with demographic and political data for each. Most of these are in
Scotland or Wales and are Labour-controlled; about half have a support scheme in place,
while half do not. Support schemes are important in raising awareness and providing
assistance to those thinking of, or using direct payments, and they are generally given a
grant by the authority to undertake this work. However, it seems that the existence of a
support group does not necessarily mean that authorities in the area will be providing
direct payments. First, tables of those authorities without any direct payment receipts are
given with relevant political and demographic data including population density for each
area.
At the opposite end of the scale, the top ten authorities with the highest numbers
of direct payment users were identified throughout the UK. In contrast to authorities
without any direct payment users (or with just one direct payment user), all of the top
ten authorities are in England and all have support schemes in place. Table 3 gives more
details for each of these authorities.
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Table 2 All authorities with support schemes but without any direct payment users in
England, Scotland and Wales
Scheme LTID Major political
Part of UK/LA type (percentage) Population Density party, March 2004
Scotland
Midlothian CIL 9 15,521 2.29 Lab/LD
North Ayrshire LA 11 135,817 1.53 Lab
East Dumbartonshire CIL 8 108,243 6.20 Lab
Stirling No info 9 86,212 5.88 Lab
Dundee Voluntary 11 145,663 24.35 Lab
Argyll & Bute None 9 91,306 0.5 Lab/LD
East Renfrewshire None 8 89,311 5.14 Lab
Falkirk None 10 145,191 4.88 Lab
Shetland None 7 21,988 1.71 LD
South Lanarkshire 7 302,216 5.8 Lab
Wales
Gwynedd CIL 20 116,843 0.5 Lab
Torfaen Voluntary 25 90,949 7.2 Lab
Conwy Voluntary 23 109,596 1.0 LD
Flintshire Voluntary 19 148,595 3.4 Lab
Merthyr Tydfil None 30 55,981 5.1 Lab
Northern Ireland
Causeway Health & None – – – –
Social Services
Craigavon & Bainbridge None – – – –
Community Trust
England
Isles of Scilly None 13 2,153 1.3 –
Sources: Current NCIL data, 2001 Census data, Direct Payments Scotland data and Parliament UK
Directory 2004.
Notes: (1) LTID= long-term illness and disability. (2) CIL stands for Centre for Integrated/Independent
Living support scheme and represents one led by disabled people. L.A. stands for local authority
led support scheme. (3) Lab stands for Labour, or New Labour and LD stands for Liberal Democrat.
(4) Density= individuals by hectare to the nearest decimal point. (5) Stirling’s scheme is ‘Forth Valley
Direct Payments Support scheme’, but it is not clear which category this falls into. It is not a user-led
scheme because Direct Payments Scotland report the development of a user-led scheme for this
area to replace ‘Forth Valley Direct Payments’. In addition all Scottish areas without Direct Payment
Support schemes are reported to be developing user-led schemes.
There are several obvious commonalities between the top ten authorities with the
highest clusters of direct payment receipts. As already mentioned all the local authorities
have support schemes and 70 per cent of these could be described as user-led (that is,
support schemes such as CILs run by disabled people). However, history is also important.
Hampshire was one of the first authorities to sanction direct payments in the 1980s and
had a strong advocacy base in its CIL. Hampshire is also one of the 70 per cent of the
‘top ten’ authorities that are Conservative controlled (although political control of local
authorities is quite volatile). This might reflect stronger localised notions of individualism,
stake holder participation and consumer choice.
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Table 3 Top ten authorities with highest clusters of direct payment users
Number Support Major
receiving scheme LTID political
LA Area direct payments type (percentage) Population Density party
Oxfordshire S.East 143 User-led 13 605,488 1.9 Con
Croydon London 150 Voluntary 15 330,587 38.2 Lab
West Sussex S.East 166 User-led 17 753,614 3.8 Con
Somerset S.East 179 Voluntary 16 199,517 5 Con
Surrey S.East 186 CIL 13 1,059,015 6.4 Con
Southampton S.West 187 CIL 17 217,445 43.6 Lab
Cheshire North 254 Disability 17 673,788 3.2 Lab
organisation
Norfolk E.Anglia 258 User Led 19 796,728 1.0 Con
Hampshire S.West 625 CIL 15 1,240,103 3.4 Con
Essex E.Anglia 642 User led 16 1,310,835 3.8 Con
Sources: Current NCIL data, 2001 Census data and Parliament UK Directory 2004.
Notes: (1) LTLID= long-term illness and disability. (2) Con stands for Conservative.
(3) Density= individuals by hectare to the nearest decimal point.
Access by d i f f e r en t use r g roups
Table 4 shows access to direct payments by different user groups in England, Wales and
Northern Ireland (data in this format were not available for Scotland), and compares the
average and range within authorities in each part of the UK. In all three areas, people
with physical and sensory impairments are by far the most likely to be receiving a direct
payment, and people with mental health problems the least likely. However, this does not
reflect the distribution of such impairments in the working age population, as indicated
by Table 5.
To summarise, early findings from the research indicate that throughout the UK,
uptake of direct payments is quite low. Whereas there has been a marked increase in their
use over the last three years, it is as yet unclear whether they will remain a marginal or
become a mainstream option. England has made greater use of direct payments than
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. However, within England there is very wide
regional variation. The North East, like its neighbours to the north, has treated the new
form of welfare provision with suspicion, whereas in certain parts of the South East, direct
payments have been embraced with relative enthusiasm. In general, Labour controlled
authorities have failed to develop direct payments, whereas in Conservative controlled
local authorities, particularly where there is a strong user-led support organisation, the
number of direct payment recipients has increasedmarkedly. There are clearly inequalities
in relation to access by different user groups, with local authorities much less likely to
sanction payments to people with learning disabilities and mental health problems. There
is also some evidence to suggest that members of minority ethnic communities have little
knowledge of direct payments and uptake is very low (Bignall and Butt, 2000; Vernon,
2002). This raises important issues of equity. In the following sections, we review some of
the questions we intend to explore further in the later phases of the study, which include
telephone interviews with authority representatives and case studies of local authorities
throughout the UK.
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Table 4 Averages and range for different user groups by authority in specific countries
Physical and
65+ Learning disability Mental health sensory impairment
Average number Average number Average number Average number
of direct payments Range for of direct payments Range for of direct payments Range for of direct payments Range for
in authorities user group in authorities user group in authorities user group in authorities user group
Northern 3.6 1–10 13.7* 2–45 1∗∗ – 6.2 2–15
Ireland
Wales 2.2 1–6 2.9 1–4 1.3 1–2 8.3 1–43
England 8.9 1–100 7.5 1–83 3.2 1–29 41.3 1–425
Sources: Current NCIL data, DoH data, LGUDW, DHSSPS.
Notes: (1) ∗Average is skewed by Armagh and Dungannon with 45 learning disability users based on current NCIL data. (2) **There is just one mental
health user in Northern Ireland in the Down Lisburn Health Trust. (3) All averages are based on the mean.
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Table 5 The reported conditions of Incapacity Benefits claimants,
May 2002
Diagnosis group Percentage of total IB claimants
Mental disorder 35
Musculo-skeletal 22
Circulation & respiratory system 11
Others 16
Nervous system 10
Injury, poisoning 6
Source: Pathways to Work: Helping People into Employment DWP, 2002.
Note: The ‘others’ category is made up of the other 13 International
Classification of Diseases diagnosis groups including (by order of size):
diseases of the digestive system; endocrine, nutritional & metabolic dis-
eases; neoplasms; certain infectious and parasitic diseases; and diseases of
the genito-urinary system.
Table 6 Quintile distribution of household income (after housing costs) for working age
adults by disability, 2001/2 (percentages)
Bottom Second Third Fourth Top
Family quintile quintile quintile quintile quintile
1 or more disabled adults 28 21 19 17 15
No disabled adults 15 14 19 24 28
Source: Households Below Average Income, 1994/5–2001/2, DWP, 2003, table 5.1.
Do d i rec t payments promote soc ia l j us t i ce?
As argued above, direct payments were promoted on the grounds that they could go
some way to redressing the economic, cultural and social inequality experienced by
disabled people. To what extent have they fulfilled this potential in the seven years since
the implementation of the legislation? In the following paragraphs, we first consider the
contribution of direct payments to both redistribution and recognition aspects of social
justice.
Di r ec t paymen ts and red i s t r i bu t i on
First, as demonstrated clearly above, direct payments are only being made available to a
tiny minority of disabled people, so their potential has not yet been realised. However, it
is clear that, compared with the non-disabled population, disabled people have a much
higher risk of poverty (see Tables 6 and 7 below). Table 6 shows that households with a
disabled person are much more likely to be in the bottom fifth in relation to household
income in comparison with households which do not include a disabled person.
Table 7 shows that households which include a disabled adult are twice as likely to
be classified as poor as those which do not include a disabled adult. Poverty is defined
as 60 per cent below the median, equivalised for differences in the composition of the
household. This is the current definition favoured by the UK Government.
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Table 7 Risk of poverty for working age adults by
disability, 2001/2 (percentages)
Family Proportion poor
One or more disabled adult 30
No disabled adult 16
Source: Households Below Average Income, 1994/5–
2001/2, DWP, 2003, table 5.7.
The greater risk of poverty is associated with exclusion from employment. DWP
figures (2003) indicate that 31 per cent of households including one disabled adult
are workless, compared with only 9.6 per cent of households with no disabled adult.
One of the strengths of direct payments is their flexibility and ability to be used to
support a range of activities including employment. The expanded use of direct payments
might therefore contribute to the Government’s goal of raising rates of economic activity
and tackling poverty, including child poverty. Much would depend on whether local
authorities encourage flexibility in their use, and make sufficiently large payments to
provide the support needed by individuals with more significant impairments to sustain
employment. Earlier research (Pearson, 2000) indicated that some local authorities used
direct payments to support personal care only. The scope and size of direct payments will
be investigated more fully in subsequent phases of the current ESRC research project.
Amongst the small number of disabled people who are receiving direct payments,
there is evidence of inequality with regard to their use by nature of impairment, local
authority and part of the UK (see above). This indicates that the potential benefits of direct
payments are being unequally distributed, and these inequalities might intensify if direct
payments are more widely used in the future.
Di r ec t paymen ts and recogn i t i on
Earlier research has demonstrated the potential of direct payments to enhance the extent
to which disabled people are able to exercise control over important aspects of their lives
(see Barnes, 2004, for a review). As noted above, the restricted use of direct payments to
date in the UK, particularly in the North East of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland, means that their contribution to improving the social status of disabled people
has been limited, but could be further developed in the future. However, there is a
danger that differences in recognition accorded to specific groups of disabled people
may be exacerbated unless local authorities make great efforts to equalise take up by
different groups. People with mental health problems, for example, have the lowest rate
of employment of any impairment group (21 per cent). Relative to their participation
in employment, they are more likely to bring cases to tribunal under the Disability
Discrimination Act, indicating a greater risk of discrimination. In addition, they make
up a third of all new Incapacity Benefits claimants. The data presented above show
that people with mental health problems are much less likely to be in receipt of direct
payments. Research has also documented the attribution of a spoiled social identity to
people with learning disabilities (Riddell et al., 2001), who are also less likely to be
in receipt of direct payments. In addition, disabled people from minority ethnic groups
83
Sheila Riddell et al.
are under-represented as direct payment users (Witcher et al., 2000). This underlines
the potential of direct payments to be used by local authorities to reinforce, rather than
challenge, existing inequalities in the social recognition accorded to particular groups of
disabled people. Close monitoring of local authority practices over time is necessary to
identify inequalities in uptake of direct payments by social class, gender, ethnicity and
impairment. The research reported here is intended to contribute to this task, although it
is already evident that improvements are needed in the routine data gathering undertaken
by local authorities.
Conc lus ion
The legislation to enable local authorities to make direct payments to disabled people was
the result of a long struggle by disabled people. As argued in this paper, direct payments
have the potential to make a major contribution to social justice for disabled people by
enabling the principles of independent living to be put into practice, in a way which
may result in a reduction in poverty and should mean an increase in respect. The fact
that uptake of direct payments has been slow, despite the growing enthusiasm of the
government, means that their potential to contribute to the creation of a more just society
has not yet been realised. If direct payments become amainstream option, there is also the
danger that the policy may become domesticated and may lose its potency for meaningful
social change. For example, some local authorities are suggesting that disabled people
might use their payments to purchase local authority services. There is also a relaxation
in the rules governing the employment of close relatives. If these services offer choice
and autonomy, then it may not matter whether the provider is in the public, private
or voluntary sector. However, there is the possibility that former relationships based on
inequality and dependency may re-emerge. On-going monitoring of local authorities’ use
and interpretation of direct payments policy is required, and we hope that the research
project described above will contribute to the process.
Finally, there is an emerging opposition to direct payments from Labour controlled
local authorities and public sector workers unions (Unison, Scotland, 2004). It is argued
that direct payments exemplify an individualised and privatised form of welfare which
threatens the pay and conditions of low-paidworkers and the principles of universal public
services. Public sector trades unions also deploy social justice arguments to oppose the
development of services which they believe threaten the power of the local authorities.
Further discussion of the principles of social justice, which underpin direct payments,
and their relationship to alternative conceptions of social justice, will need to take
place.
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